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I
LEVELING THE PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE
DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE: AN APPLICATION
TO SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES
Michael L. Wachter and William L. Wascher*
Abslrau - To max.i mize lifetime discounted earnings , ind ividu als ac t so as to t1ll in the peaks and troughs of th e demograph.i c
cycles exhibited by popul a tio n and hence relative income. As a
consequence. those born pri or to the peak mcrease thCJr school
enrollment rat es. wh ile th ose tra.J.!ing the peak dec rease the ir
school enrollment rates. Education thus provides a differenti al
track.in o0 mech an.i sm. While indi viduals canno t choose th e
cohorts in which they are bo rn, they are able to time their entry
into the career labo r market through education. Th.is asymm etric demoo raph.ic effec t is tested in a time series equation. Our
mod el h~lps to expla.in the " surprisi ngly" steep declin e In
school enrollment rates during the 1970s.

I.

Introduction

CONOMIC-DEMOGRAPHIC interrelationships have received considerable attention over
the past decade. Of particular interest has been the
effect of cohort size on labor market variables such
as relative income, labor force participation, unemployment, and fertility. Richard A. Easterlin's
(1968) seminal study analyzed the potential of a
long-run economic cycle generated by shifts in the
fertility rate. The key independent variable in his
analysis was a measure of cohort size. Large cohorts
suffered a depression in their relative wages and,
hence, begot small cohorts. The higher relative
income of the smaller cohorts was hypothesized to
lead to a renewed upswing in fertility.
Studies on labor force participation rates
(Wachter, 1972, 1976) indicated that large cohorts
had higher labor force participation rates. Equilibrium unemployment rates were also shown to
increase as large cohorts entered the labor market
(Perry, 1971; Wachter, 1976; and Ehrenberg, 1980)_
The impact of cohort size on relative income was
explored, for example, by Freeman (1979), Welch
(1979), and Berger (1981).
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The effect of cohort size on school enrollment
rates has received less attention than the demographic impact on unemployment and relative
wages. Richard Freeman's important study, The
Overeducated American, touched upon the influence of cohort size, but his focus was on the
declining rate of return to education. 1 In a review
article, Smith and Welch (1978) emphasized the
cohort theme and argued that this factor caused
the decline in the rate of return to education.
Mattila (1982) examined the effects of rates of
return to education on school enrollment rates and
mentioned that cohort size might be a cause of the
changes in the rate of return. The notion that
school enrollment rates have responded positively
to cohort overcrowding received empirical support
from Wachter and Kim (1982). That study found
that cohort overcrowding led to a flow of individuals out of employment into unemployment, school,
and out of the labor force. 2
In this study we argue that the effects of cohort
overcrowding may be more complicated in that
important asymmetric effects may be the dominant characteristics. Specifically, for some phenomena the size of the cohort may be less important to individual decisions than the position of
individuals relative to the peaks and troughs of the
demographic cycle. This model is tested on school
enrollment rate fluctuations. The basic hypothesis,
as applied to this time series, is that individuals
born at the beginning of the baby boom are likely
to have the highest enrollment rates while those
born at the end are likely to have the lowest rates
-even though both groups were born into cohorts
of equal size (relative to the overall population).
The rationale for the hypothesis, which we refer to
as the differential tracking model, is that the maximization of discounted lifetime earnings pushes
individuals to distance themselves as much as possible from the peak fertility year cohorts.
1 See also Free man (1975 . 1977).
2
Ahlburg. C rimmins, and Easterlin (1981), on the other ha nd ,
foun d th e opposite result.
The internati onal data on school enrollment rates have bee n
an alyzed by Reubens. H arri sson, and Rupp (l 9R 1 ).
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LEV ELING THE DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE
The model is explained in sec tion II. The empirical results, based on enrollm ent rate dat a for
the U nited States, are presented in sectio n III.
Section IV draws th e conclusions and implications
of th e model for economic policy.
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The Differential Tracking Model

Consider a model where all individual s go
through two stages-one where they combine
schooling and work and the other where they onl y
work. Individuals hold two jobs over their work life : a ca reer job an d an en try or yo uth job. The
crucial demographic effect that individuals must
deal with is that the career j ob wage varies inversely with cohort size. 3
Born into a specific cohort, indi viduals face
either favorab le or unfavorabl e prospec ts. They
Can however alter their initial fate or cohort size
'
'
in order to improve their prospects. In our stylized
model , individuals can be viewed essentially as
shifting th eir career cohort by adjusting school
enrollment ra tes so as to maximize discounted
lifetime earnings.
The key to maximizing lifetime income is to be
in the smallest size career cohort possible and thus
have the highest career wage possible. If a small
cohort is ahead, individuals take the fast track by
attending school more intensively. This enables
them to move ahead so as to be a member of and
to compete with that smaller cohort. Trailed b y a
small cohort, individuals take the slow track, extending their noncareer entry jobs and absorbing
their education at a leisurely pace. This tracking
system is illustrated in figure 1. The fast track is
depicted by curve FF 1 and the slow track b y SS 1 .
Note that the slow track is slow only with respect
to the delay in starting the career job. 4
After individuals devote a minimum amount of
time to stage one, they choose how much of their
remaining worklife to devote to each stage. Individuals taking the normal track (case A) spend T1
in the first period and obtain an average amount
3
To a lesser extent this is also true of the youth wage , bu t in
our formal develop ment of the model, we assumed that the
yo uth wage was constant to facilitate th e analysis. .
4
For ease of exposition, the fast and slow tracks m figure l
have th e same career wage. No te, howeve r, that an y si ngl e
individual cannot move fo rward or backward with th e same
resulting career wage. The analysis in the next section will
indicate whi ch individuals can improve th eir caree r wage by
moving for.vard and which individuals benefit fro m movi ng
backward across co horts.
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o f schooling. They then find career jobs at a wage
determined by the initial cohort size. Individuals
taking the fast track (case B) also spend T1 in the
first stage. However, these individuals obtain more
than average schooling and so incur added costs
associated with school enrollment during the first
stage. In stage two, they are able to compete with
earlier and smaller cohorts in order to earn a
higher career wage. Individuals taking the slow
track (case C) delay entering the career labor
market until T{ and incur a cost which depends
upon the differential between the career wage and
the entry wage. They can then compete with a
smaller cohort in stage two and earn a higher
career wage.
The choices available to the individual are thus
to move to an earlier career cohort through intensive schooling, to move to a later cohort via less or
more leisurely schooling, or to stay in the same
birth cohort.
Given that the career wage is assumed to be
inversely related to cohort size, it can be shown
that individuals will move away from the peak
cohort by obtaining more schooling in the pre-peak
region and by delaying career entry in the postpeak region. In particular, individuals move ahead
in terms of their career cohort so that the ma rginal
benefit or higher wage received from an additional
unit of schooling equal s the marginal cost of obtaining that unit in terms of forgo ne earni ngs on
entry jobs a nd the marginal cos t of education.
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Whereas the margi nal cost of moving ahead is a
function of the cost of sch ooling and the res ultin g
forgo ne yo uth wage, for a n individual moving
backward , the marginal cost of moving is a fun cti on of the adult- yout h wage di ffere nti al for th e
extra tim e spen t in youth jobs. The abi lity of
individu als to move to a desired career cohort is
limited by increasing margin al costs of swi tchin g
cohorts. A rigorous development o f this model can
be found in Wachter and Wascher (1984).
The tracking effect depends in part on the existence of vintage effects in human capital; that is,
ra ther than havi ng a single career labor market
across age groups, age group s are imperfectly substitutable for each other. In this case, the earnings
of older adults are partially shielded from the
degree of overcrowding in the entering cohort.
Each new group has its own age- earnings profile
that only partially reflects excess demand conditions before or af ter the career group. 5
To the extent that specific training is pervasive,
vintage effects should be important. If there is
learning-by-doing, each year's new job entrants
will be differentiated and, hence, partially insulated from those coming before and after. Employers who use either formal or informal tenure
procedures are validating vintage effects. Most
professional and administrative markets function
in this way, from universities with formal tenure
rules to law firms with virtually formal tenure rules
to management positions with a policy of "up or
out." Seniority systems for blue collar workers also
create formal vintage effects. These employment
policies suggest that vintage effects are widespread
and, thus, that timing one's entry into the tenure
or vintage system can be used to alter one's lifetime earnings stream.
III.

Empirical Results

We estimate a model in which individuals are
assumed to base school enrollment decisions,
5Absent this effect, there would be only one age-earnings
profile for all career workers. The profile need not be ft at in
th at seniority wage increases could be institutionalized. Excess
demand conditions, howeve r, would be uniform for all career
workers, so that an oversized, entry career group would not
experience a disproportionate wage effect compared wi th older
career workers.
Empirical tes ting of human capital vintage effects is scanty
du e to data limitations. Welch (1979), for example, found th at
vi ntage effects existed but were stronges t in the early career
years and tended to dissip ate with age. Freeman (1980) and
Berger (1 981), however, found lasting vintage effects.

ceteris paribus, on the rel a ti ve sizes of the cohorts
preceding and following them . This is measured by
th e ra ti os of the population approximately ten
years ahead or behind to the own co hort population. RS1 and RS0 are the relative sizes of the
younger and older cohorts, respect ively .6 The hypotheses have been tes ted using an annual time
series of school enrollment fro m 1948 to 1980. Six
demographic groups are represented: three age
groups-16 to 17, 18 to 19, an d 20 to 24 ; and each
age group for males an d females. 7
Since our purpose is to tes t ou r demographic
hypo thesis, we have adopted the basic time series
schooling equation format generally used by
o thers. 8 In addition to the leadin g (RS,. ) and lagging (RS0 ) cohort b arriers, we have inCluded real
income (Y), military (MIL and DRAFT in the
male equations) and marriage (MA R in the female
equations) variables. A measure of labor market
tightness proved to be sta tistically insignifican t
and has been omitted from the fin al results. 9
Following the specification adopted by Mattila
(1982), two variables are used to capture separately military enlistment and draft effects on
school enrollment. The argument is that although
draft pressure encourages higher school enrollment
ra tes, the rate of enlistment itself will decrease
enrollment rates by taking some males who would
have enrolled in school otherwise. Draft pressure
is measured as the percentage of males inducted
into the armed forces between 1960 and 1972, and
the enlistment variable is simply the percentage of
males in each age cohort in the armed forces .
The results in table 1 impose the restriction that
individuals respond equally to changes in the size
of leading and lagging cohorts; that is, the coefficients on RSY and RSo are equal in absolute
values. (The ratio of RS0 / RSY is denoted by RS.)
In table 2, RSY and RS0 are entered separately.
6

The demographic and school enrollment variables are in
logarithmic form. Construction of all variables is presented in
th e appendix.
7
Due to data limitations, the sample period for the 16 to 17
a~e groups is 1953 to 1980.
See, for example, Wachter and Kim (1982); Ahlburg,
Crimmins, and Easterlin (1981); and Mattila (1982).
9
The specific variable used was the aggregate unemployment
rate divided by a demographically adjusted measure of the
equilibrium unemployment rate U* The coefficients on the
UGA P = UI U* variable were not significant for any of
the age-sex groups when included in equations similar to th ose
in tables 1 and 2. We have omitted UGA P from the tables in
th e text due to probable rnulticollineari ty between UGA P, Y,
and the trend variable .

.,I
i
!

I
I

i

1

l

J

·]
l

Il

. j

,j
j
I

l

I
l

211

LEVELING THE DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE
TABLE I. -SC HOOL ENRO LL/.1ENT EQUATI ONS: EQUA L E ITECTS FOR LE ADING AND
LA GG ING BA RRIE RS

Males
16-17

Females
16- 17

Males
18- 19

Females
18- 19

Males
20-24

Females
20-24

c

- 0.322
(- 5.83)

-0 .419
(- 8.95)

- 1.1 81
( - 8 33)

- 1.414
( - 4 99)

- 2.252
(- 20.62)

- 2.588
(- 3 06)

RS

-0.247
(- 5.29)

- 0.250
(- 6.90)

- 0.6 76
( - 6 65)

- 0.421
( - 4.02)

- 0.734
(-445)

-0.663
(- 2 51)

0. 028
(4 72)

0.042
(91 4)

0.055
(4.00)

0. 105
(5.31)

0.08 5
(5 .78)

0.220
(4 70)

y

i'vf 1L

- 0.020
( - 4 34)

MAR
DRAFT

-0.01 5
( - 3 24)

-0.039
(-371)

0.0004
(0.93)

- 0.006
( - 2 52)
- 0.016
( -- 2.52)

0.005
(3.98)

-0.018
(- 2 01)
0.0007
(0.3 1)

R"

0.916

0.928

0.935

0.938

0.93 9

0.959

D .W.

1.57

1.68

206

225

1. 82

1.90

N o te: l. The depend ent variable is the log of the school enrollmen t rate for each J gc-scx group .
2. Indepe nde n t va ri ables:
C = constant.
RS = log of the rati o of kading to lagging demographic harriers. Sec the appendix, poi nts 2 and J.
Y = real income .
MIL = mi li tary e nlis tment rate for ma k s in each age group.
A1.4 R = marri age rate for fe males in each age gro up .
DRAFT~ milit ary draft fo r males .
1. !-statist ics a re in paren theses.
4. The data are annual observa tions fro m 1948 to 1980 for the 18 to 19 a nd 20 to 24 age groups. a nd fro m 1953 to
1980 fo r the 16 to 17 age groups.
5. The equations for the 20 to 24 year old groups were estim a ted using a maximum likelihood iterative technique to
co rrec t for possible serial correlation.
6. The estima ted values o f p were 0.312 for males a nd 0.287 fo r fem ales.

The results of table 1 show that the differential
tracking system is highly significant for all of the
six age-sex groups with the correct negative sign
on the RS variable. Those individuals born prior
to a peak fertility rate year have a larger group of
competitors following them than ahead (that is,
RS is low) and thus have high school enrollment
rates. Those individuals with a larger number of
competitors ahead of them have lower school enrollment rates.
Efforts to include both a time trend and the real
income variable in the model were unsuccessful
due to the high collinearity between them. However, the real income variable, when included alone,
is always significant, presumably capturing the
long-run positive income elasticity that is generally
found for school enrollment.
The draft pressure variable is significant and
positive for the age group most likely to be drafted,
namely, the 18 to 19 year old male group. The
enlistment rate va riable is nega tive and significant
for every male age group, capturing those males

who would have otherwise been enrolled in school.
A marriage rate variable is included in the female
equations. That variable is negative and significant
for every age group.
In table 2, we allow for unequal attention to
leading and lagging cohorts by including RSY and
RS0 as distinct variables. All of the leading barriers, RS0 , appear with the expected negative sign
and all of the lagging barriers, RS,, with the
expected positive sign. Ten of the twelve coefficients are significant with t-values greater than 2.
Hence, these results are highly supportive of the
asymmetric or differential tracking model. Tests
for the equality in absolute value of the coefficients
on the leading and lagging barriers did not reject
the null hypothesis that changes in the size of
leading and lagging cohorts yield equal changes in
the school enrollment decisions of individuals.
As mentioned above, our demographic variable
measures a different phenomenon from that captured by the tradi tiona! cohort size variable.
Specifically, th e own cohort's size variable is equal
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TABLE 2.-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: WEIGHTED UNEQUAL EFfECTS FOR LEADING
AND LAGGING BARRIERS
Males
16-17

Females
16-17

Males
18 - 19

Females
18 - 19

-0.306
( -4.83)

-0.407
( -7 04)

- 1.231
( -7.78)

-1.312
( -4 39)

-2.272
(-1326)

- 1.653
(- 1 74)

RS,

0.213
(2 65)

0.232
(3 69)

() 773
(4 62)

0.280
(1.64)

0.718
(3.62)

1148
(3 09)

RSO

-0.261
( -4 80)

-0.263
(- 512)

- 0.55·~
( -2.84)

-0.564
( - 3 26)

-0.774
(2 67)

-0.283
(- 0 94)

0028
(460)

0.042
(8.59)

0.054
(3.88)

0.101
(5 03)

0.084
(4.60)

0.214
(5 14)

c

y

i'v!J L

·- 0.017
(- 3 07)

-0.036
(- 2.84)

DRAFT

-0.025
( -· 2 73)

0.005
(3 82)

0.0005
(1.04)

Females
20-24

-0.006
(- 238)
- 0 014
(- 2 28)

-0 019
( -· 3 58)

1'v!AR

Males
20-24

0.0006
(0.25)

R2

0 917

0.929

0.937

0.940

0.938

0.968

D.W.

1.61

l.6R

2.11

2.20

1.81

1.88

Note: See the key to tab\c 1 Note the following exceptions:
RSf. = the log of the ratio of the size of the neighboring younger cohort

to

the size of the own cohort.

RS0 = the log of the ratio of the size of the neighhoring older cohort to the size of the own cohort.
The estimated values of p in the 20 to 24 age group equations \vere 0.316 for males cmd 0.163 for females.

to the percentage of the total population that is in
a particular cohort. It is a measure of the height of
the population density function. The demographic
variables constructed here (RS,. and RS0 or RS),
however, can be viewed as an approximation to
the slope of the density function at a particular
cohort point.
A statistical test of the asymmetric demographic
effect (measured by RS) against the traditional
cohort size model (measured by the percentage of
the population in a given cohort, denoted by RP)
supports the former. Specifically, the F-statistics
for the test of the model without RS versus the
unconstrained version (table 3, column 2) are always significant, while the F-statistics for the test
of the model without the traditional cohort size
variable versus the unconstrained model (table 3,
column 1) are not significant in any group. 10
An alternative structural approach would view
enrollment rates as being determined by the rate
10
We also note that in the unconstrained model containing
both our demographic variable, RS, and the RP construct. RS
remained significant with the expected negative sign in all
cases. However, the variable that measures the own cohort's
size entered significantly in only two of the six equations
(icmaks 16 to 17, 20 to 24), and then only one had the
anticipated sign.

of return to schooling, which is in turn a function
of demographic variables. Our model, however, is
a reduced form equation with exogenous variables
on the right-hand side. The problem with implementing the structural approach is that our model
indicates that observed rates of return are likely to
be biased measures of the expected rates. Specifically, the observed rate of return only reflects
cohort size pressure of older groups and necessarily excludes the impact of lagging cohort sizes
on expected rates of return. Consequently, expectations based only on leading cohort sizes are
biased.
We did, however, test our model against the
alternative specification which included observable
rates of return on education as independent variables. The specific rate of return variable that we
used was constructed by Mattila (1982). In models
which contained both the rate of return to education and our demographic variables, the rate of
return effect was not statistically significant.
That individuals use lagging as well as leading
cohort size indicators in their decision process
means that they attempt to use all of the information currently available. There is some support in
the literature that individuals are aware of demo-
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TABLE

3. -

TESTS O F ALTERNATIVE DEM O GRAP HI C SPEC ifiCA T ION S

Un constrained Mod el
versus
Ditkrent ial Tracking M odel

Un co nstrained Mc>Jc l
vers us
Own Cohort Size M e>d cl

F-Stati sti c "

F-Sta tistic "

Males 16-17
Fem ales 16-17
Males 18- 19
Females 18-1 9
Ma les 20- 24
Females 20- 24
Note: T he D iffere nti al Trac ki ng model is th e

0.09
0.66

18.36h
24
l7.07h
l 7.14 h

nn

236
1 07
0.006
3.66
llh)(k l

1135 °
5 63 h
p resented in tab le 1 The 0\v n Co hort Size model i:--

:1n

~ qu .1tio n id e ntica l to th at o f tahk l. hut with the pcrcenta gt: of the p opu l.J.ti on in th e own cohort ( H.P) in piJ Cl'

(• f
RS. T he unc o nst rJ.. incd modd includ es ho th I? P and RS as expla na to ry va ri ahles.
3
A sign ilicant F-s uu is tic mean s th at the null h y pot hc ~is ( Di tkn.:: ntia l Track ing o r Qv.,·n Cohort Size) can b L" rcjL'L'tcd
in favo r of the un Cl)ns tr ain ed nH•d el
hSi g.n itlcan t at the 0.05 level.

graphic consideration s. The foreword to Ru ssell
(1982) states that, "Probably no one born during
the baby boom th a t extended from just after World
War II to the early 1960s is unaware of belonging
to a special generation."
Given current discussi ons over whether school
enrollment rates have stopped or even reversed
their historical upward swing, it is useful to decompose the enrollment equations to isolate the
contribution of the differential tracking model.
This decomposition is performed by comparing
the fitted values of school enrollment rates using
the coefficients in table 1 with the fitted values
computed at the means of the demographic variables.
The contribution of the differential tracking
model to school enrollment rate trends is shown in
table 4.ll The results indicate that teenagers born
prior to the peak fertility years increased their
school enrollment rates during the 1960s approximately 2.5% above the benchmark level predicted by real income, military, and marriage rate
considerations. Those who were 20 to 24 years of
age during the 1960s exhibited a 2% increase in
school enrollment rates above the benchmark.
II To isolate the demographic contribution to school enrollment rates, we first compute values for school enrollment rates
a t the mean of the demographic barrier variable. The contribution o f the differenti al tracking efl"ect can th en be calc ulated as
the fitted school enrollment rates minus the trend school enrollment rates. Because we need to use a benchmark value of RS
(in thi s case, the mean) in the computation of the trend, the
particular level of the series for the co ntribution o f th e demograp hic va riables is con ditioned on th e value of the benchm ark.
That is, we cannot uniquel y d efine, for example, a neutral o r
ze ro demograph ic effec t. Since table 4 refer s to th e contribution
of the dem ographic effect over the benchm o. rk , we concentrate
o n the swi ng in school enrollmen t rates over the 1960s a nd
1970s.

By the late 1970s, demographic considerations
had reversed. Although youth cohorts were still
large, they were now composed of individuals born
after the peak rather than before the peak fertility
years. The shift from the fa st to the slow track
meant a swing of between 3 and 7 percentage
points for school enrollment rates. Teenage enrollment rates were approximately 4 percentage points
below our benchmark, while 20 to 24 year olds
reduced their rates by less than 1 percentage point.
The results of this model indicate that the unusual swings in school enrollment rates over the
past two decades have been an endogenous response to the unusually large swings in the population profile. The trend rate of increase in school
enrollment rates seems to be intact, but the intermediate-run demographic cycle has caused large
deviations from that trend. In this sense, school
enrollment rates were "too high" in the 1960s and
were then "too low" in the 1970s.
IV.

Conclusion

In this paper we advance the hypothesis that
individuals respond to cohort overcrowding differently depending upon whether they lead or trail
the peak fertility year cohort. To maximize lifetime
discounted earnings, individuals act so as to fill in
the peaks and troughs of the demographic cycles
exhibited by population and, hence, relative income.
The heuristic explanation for this phenomenon
is the following: Baby boom individuals born before the peak in the fertility rate increase their
human ca pital accumulation as a way of escapi ng
from the huge cohort behind th em. Education,
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TA BLE 4. -CONTIUBUTION Of THE DIFFERE NTI AL TRAC KI NG EFFECT TO C!-1.\:-/GE S
I N S C HOO L [ N ROLU!E NT RATES
(PERCENTAGE PO I NTS)

1960- 1969
1970- 1975
1'176 - 19l>O

Mal es
16- 17

Females
16- 17

Males
18 - 19

Females
18-19

Males
20-24

Females
20 - 24

2.63
- 0.77
- 4.30

2.56
-0.77
- 4.29

4.26
0.3 7
- 4. 14

2 03
0 18
- 2.52

2.76
2.22
- 0.50

1.36
142
- 0.42

wheth er general or specific, can be viewed as a
"fast track., , By buying th e ticket (the cost of
additional trainin g) and entering the fa st track, the
early a rrival s can put greater di stance between
them selves and the peak group. Those born after
the peak fertilit y year, however, face a different
problem . With the bulk of the cohort ahead of
them , th ere is no press ure to buy the ticket. The
fa st track only leads to an entry spot in the already
oversized peak group. Hence, if anything, this
group has the incentive of p aying for the least
amount of education. This allows them to use the
least costly slow track and , hence, to draw closer
to the undersized baby bust cohort.
Education thus provides a differential tracking
mechanism . While individuals cannot choose the
cohorts in which they are bo rn , they are able to
time their entry into the career labor market
through education. Those who want to speed ahead
in order to compete with earlier cohorts engage in
intensive education during their youth. Those who
want to slow down in order to compete with later
cohorts extend their noncareer job period and take
a more leisurely approach to education.
Thi s asymmetric demographic effect dominates
the more traditional cohort size hypothesis.
According. to the latter view, it is the size of the
cohort rather than one's position relative to the
peak and trough that counts. Those born five years
before the peak birth rate are predicted to behave
in a similar fashion to those born approximately
five years after the peak. Although empirical results based on this model suggest that large cohorts
tend to have large school enrollment rates , the
issue is empirical since the theory itself does not
yield a predicted sign.
The asymmetric or differential tracking sys tem
indicates that position in the cycle rather than the
size of one's initial cohort dominates certain types
of decisions such as schooling. This effect helps to
explain the surp ri singl y steep decline in school
enrollment rates during the 1970s (in relati o n to

past trend rates of growth) as well as the very high
enrollment rat es observed during the 1960s. Essentiall y, our empirical result s indica te that a tte mpt s
to escape the p eak in cohort overcrowding resulted
in a negative swing in school enrollment rates of 3
to 7 percentage points between the 1960s and
1970s.
If it is positio n rather than cohort size that
m a tters, then the tendency to move away from
peak-sized coh or ts toward tro ugh-sized cohorts
should continue to contribute negativel y to enrollment rates fo r several more years. Cohorts
entering their youth period will be smaller than
preceding cohorts, but more importantly, they will
be post-peak cohorts. Thereafter the effect should
turn positive.
A lthough we have applied the asymmetric demographic model only to school enrollment rates,
it may also affect other labor supply and investment decisions. We view our model and results as
tentati ve but perhaps suggestive of these more
general applications to the stud y of demographic
and economic relationships.

DATA APPENDIX
Definition and Construction of Variables
l. School Enrollment Rates are the percentage of the total
noninstitutional population in each age- sex group enrolled
in school.

Source: U.S. Bureau o f the Ce nsus, Series P-20, School
Enrollmen t, C urrent Population Reports, various issues.
2. The Relative Youn ger Cohort variable ( RS,) is the ratio of
the size of the neighb oring youn ge r cohor t to the ow n coho rt
SIZe.

For the 16 to 17 groups:
POP 6-15/POP 16- 17
F or the 18 to 19 groups:
POP 8-17/ POP 18-19
F or th e 20 to 24 groups:
POP 10-19/ POP 20- 24.

j
1

i

~

i
l

LEVELING THE DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE
The \\·cighting sc he me gives a weight of 1.0 to the closest
neig hbo rin g ,i nglc age groups Jnd dccrcJses the weig ht by
l j n for every addi tion J I year, n, a group is from the cohort
o f in te rest. l'or C.\ amp lc. fo r the 16 to 17 group s. the
ne igh boring lagging cohort is defmcd JS
0.1 · POP(6) + O.ll POP( 7) + 0.125 · POP( 'ii ) +
t-0.5 · POP(14) + 1.0 · PO P (lS)
The \\ Cights on these arc Jrbit rary and a rc meant to cap ture
the de clini ng vin tage crrect:i. Changing the weights had littk
dTcct o n the re,;ul ts.
Population in anv Jge - sex gro up is the to tal no nins tituti,, nal
population for a given year.
Sou rce· US Depa rtm ent of LJ bo r. BureJu of Labor Stat istic s. Bull etin 2096, Labor Force Stalistics DeriL'ed
from 1he CwH:nt Populalion Suruer: A Duwhook
(Sep t. 19[)2)
3. The Relative Old er Cohort variable ( RS") is the rJtin of the
size o f th e neigh boring older cohor t to the size o f the ow n
cohort.
Fo r the 16 to 17 groups:
POP 18- 27/POP 16-17

For the 18 to 19 groups:
POP 20 - 29/PO P 18-19

For the 20 to 24 groups:
POP 25 - 34/ POP 20-24 .

The weigh ts are similar to those above.
4. The Sym metric Demographic variable is th e rel a tive size of
the olde r cohort to the younger co hort. The breakdown is
simi lar to that used above.
5. The Ow n Cohort 's Size vari able is measured as the population in a give n cohort re la ti ve to the to tal population.
6. Real Income is median annual income for males 45 to 54
years of age in thousands of 1967 doll ars.
Source: U .S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-60. Consumer
In come, Current Population Reports, various iss ues.
7. The Draft variable = 0 for 1948 to 1959 and for 1973 to
1980
= (inductees per 1,000 males 16 + )
1960 to 1972.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Swtistical Abstract of
th e U.S ., various issues.
8. Marriage variab le = the percentage of females in each age
group eve r married.
Source: US. Bureau o f the Census, Series P-20, M arital
Status and Li vi ng Arrangements, Curren t Population Reports, various issues.
9. Military variab le = th e percentage of males in each age
group in the armed forces in each year.
Source: U .S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta tistics, Bulletin 2096, Labor Force Statistics Derit'ed
from the Current Population Suruey: A Databook
(Sept. 1982)
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